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Hopkins v. State: 
In-Court Voice Exemplar Given for Non-Testimonial Purposes may be Admissible 
where the Exemplar is Relevant and Reliable 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a non-
testimonial voice exemplar given by 
the defendant at trial did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
against compelled self incrimination 
Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 721 
A.2d 231 (citing United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 
(1969». The court further held, in an 
issue of first impression in Maryland, 
that such in-court voice identification 
evidence may be admissible where 
such evidence is relevant and reliable. 
On April 27, 1996, the 
defendant, Marquis Hopkins 
("Hopkins"), robbed Mr. and Mrs. 
Franklin McQuay at gunpoint in a 
parking lot. Id. at '150, 721 A.2d at 
233. While placing the gun to Mr. 
McQuay's head, Hopkins stated, 
"Yo, check it out." Id. Additionally, 
Hopkins made several threatening 
statements and made his escape with 
the couple's valuables. Id. Afterthe 
robbery, Mrs. McQuay called the 
police and gave a physical description 
of Hopkins. Id. at 151, 721 A.2d at 
233. A month later, Mrs. McQuay 
identified Hopkins from a 
photographic line-up, but indicated on 
the back of the photo that she needed 
to see him in person and hear him 
speak to be certain of her 
identification. Id. 
At trial, Mrs. McQuay visually 
identified Hopkins as the robber. Id. 
The defense challenged the 
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identification, and on re-direct 
examination, the prosecution 
requested the court to compel 
Hopkins to stand and state, "Yo, 
check it out." Id. at 152, 721 A.2d at 
234. The defense objected, arguing 
that the request was untimely. Id. The 
trial court ruled that any lapse in time 
affected the weight of the evidence, 
not its admissibility, and therefore 
allowed the voice exemplar. Id. at 
153, 721 A.2d at 234. After hearing 
the voice exemplar, Mrs. McQuay 
reasserted her identification of 
Hopkins. Id. She said Hopkins's 
voice was distinguishable from that of 
other African Americans because he 
was "articulate." Id. The Baltimore 
County Circuit Court subsequently 
convicted Hopkins of robbery with a 
deadly and dangerous weapon and 
several other lesser offenses. Id. at 
149, 721 A.2d at 233. 
Hopkins appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland. Id. 
at 154, 721 A.2d at 235. Although 
the defense never made a Fifth 
Amendment objection at trial, or 
object to the characterization of 
Hopkins' voice as "articulate," it 
raised these issues on appeal. Id. The 
court of special appeals exercised its 
discretion to address the issues, and 
affinned the conviction. Id The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari on the same issues, and 
upheld the ruling of the court of special 
appeals. Id. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by noting that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibition against self 
incrimination does not protect a 
defendant from being compelled to 
write or speak solely for identification 
purposes. Id. (citing Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 
(1966». The Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Wade, held that 
voice identifications compelled during 
line-ups are admissible as evidence 
of an identifying characteristic, not as 
testimonial evidence, and therefore 
did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. at 155, 721 A.2d at 235 (citing 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218,222-23 (1969». Evenrequiring 
a defendant to recite the words 
spoken during the commission of a 
crime was not considered testimonial 
because the defendant's voice was 
used as an identifying characteristic, 
and not to disclose his knowledge of 
facts. Id. The court analogized this 
case to Vandergrift v. State, where 
the court of special appeals held that 
a court may order a defendant to 
read a transcript aloud at trial. Id. at 
156, 721 A.2d at 236 (citing 
Vandergrift v. State, 82 Md. App. 
617,639,573 A.2d 56,66 (1990». 
In both Hopkins and Vandergrift, 
the court determined that the voice 
exemplar was not used as testimonial 
evidence. Id. 
Rejecting Hopkins' argument 
that the voice exemplar should have 
been given prior to trial, the court 
noted that since the voice exemplar's 
prupose was for identification, it made 
no difference that the trial court 
compelled the exemplar at trial as 
opposed to before trial. Id. (citing 
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 
210 (1988». This finding was 
consistent with the court's prior 
holding that requiring a suspect to 
display physical characteristics to aid 
identification did not cause a defendant 
toincrhninatehimself Id at 157,721 
A.2d at 236 (citing Dyson v. State, 
238 Md. 398, 404, 209, A.2d 609, 
619 (1965». 
Hopkins' claimed that the 
exemplar was unnecessary because 
the witness physically identified him 
prior to the voice exemplar, and it was 
therefore testimonial in nature. Id. 
(citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 210). The 
court, however, noted that a 
defendant's communications must 
convey factual information to be 
considered testimonial. Id. 
Furthermore, the court reasoned, the 
exemplar's purpose was not to elicit 
testimonial evidence, but rather to 
bolster the witness's testimony 
because the defense challenged the 
physical identification. Id. 
After determining that the voice 
exemplar did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment, the court next addressed 
the admissibility of such evidence. The 
court found that it is within the trial 
judge's discretion to admit the voice 
exemplar. Id. at 158, 721 A.2d at 
23 7 (citing Vandergrift, 82 Md. App. 
at 639, 573 A.2dat66 (1990». The 
decision to admit the voice exemplar 
may be reversed only where there was 
an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing 
Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 
121, 702 A.2d 741, 749 (1997». 
Because the court had never 
before addressed when trial courts 
could admit in-court voice 
identification evidence, it looked to 
other jurisdictions for guidance. In 
State v. Newman, the Supreme Court 
ofNebraska held that non-testimonial 
voice exemplars were not 
automatically admissible, and may only 
be introduced at trial if such evidence 
is relevant and reliable. Id. at 159, 
721 A.2d at 238 (citing State v. 
Newman, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752 
(Neb. 1996». InPeoplev. Scarola, 
the court similarly held that the test of 
whether a voice exemplar is 
admissible depends on whether it is 
relevant and reliable. Id. (citing 
People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 
770 (1988». Afterreviewing case 
law from other jurisdictions, the court 
examined evidentiary rules for the 
admissibility of the voice exemplar. 
Maryland Rule 5-401 reads, in 
pertinent part, states that evidence is 
"relevant if it tends to make the 
existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of 
the action more or less probable." Id. 
(citing MD. R. EVID. 5-401). 
Maryland Rule 5-403 also provides 
that relevant "evidence [may] be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial affect." Id. The 
determination of whether the probative 
value of an in-courtvoice identification 
is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect is also within the trial 
court's discretion. Id (citing People 
v. Davis, 502 N.E.2d 731 (1987». 
Because relevance and reliability are 
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separate issues, as a threshold matter, 
the court noted that relevance should 
be determined first. Id. at 160, 721 
A.2d at 238. 
In Hopkins, the court found the 
exemplar relevant because the 
defense challenged the witness's 
visual identification of Hopkins. Id. 
at 163, 721 A.2d at 239. The court 
recognized the potential prejudicial 
effect of requiring a defendant to utter 
the same words a suspect used while 
committing a crime, however, the 
court did not believe the exemplar's 
prejudicial value substantially 
outweighed its probative value. Id at 
163-64,721 A.2d at 239-40. (citing 
Davis, 502 N.E.2d at 783 (1987». 
After finding the exemplar 
relevant in this case, the court next 
addressed its reliability. Id. at 159, 
721 A.2d at 238. In so doing, the 
court adopted the test set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Neil 
v. Biggers. Id at 160, 721 A.2d at 
238 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188,199(1972». UndertheBiggers 
test, factors for courts to consider 
when determining the reliability of 
identification evidence include: 
(1) the ability of the witness to 
hear the assailant speak, (2) the 
witness's degree of attention, (3) 
the accuracy of any prior 
identifications that the witness 
made, (4) the period of time 
between the incident and the 
identification, and (5) how certain 
the witness was in making the 
identification 
Id. (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199). 
In employing the Biggers test, the 
court followed the two- pronged test 
used by other jurisdictions. Id. First, 
29.2 U. BaIt. L.F. 59 
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the exemplar was suggeStive, the court 
examines the totality of circtunStances 
to determine if the identification was 
reliable enough to avoid 
misidentification. Id. at 161, 721 
A.2d at 238 (citing Rodriguez v. 
Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 556 (7th Cir. 
1995». The second prong requires 
the application of the Biggers factors. 
Id. 
Hopkins argued the exemplar 
was unreliable and it was suggestive 
because he was the only African 
American in the courtroom. Id. at 
165,721 A.2dat240. Thecourtheld 
that the prior visual identifications 
made the exemplar identification 
reliable. Id. The court dismissed the 
suggestiveness issue, citing Webster 
v. State, which held that a suggestive 
identification was admissible where it 
was reliable. Id. at 165-66, 721 A.2d 
at 240-41 (citing Webster v. State, 
299 Md. 581,601,474 A.2d 1305, 
1315 (1984». Having found the 
exemplar "sufficiently reliable under 
the totality of circumstances," the 
court of appeals applied the Biggers 
factors in Hopkins, and found the 
facts satisfied its requirements. Id. at 
164-65, 721 A.2d at 240. 
Relying upon the relevancy and 
reliability test set forth in Biggers, the 
court held the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by admitting the 
exemplar into evidence. With this 
holding, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has crept its way to the edge 
of a very slippery slope upon which it 
must be cognizant not to cross, for 
fear of violating a defendant's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination by compelling him to 
essentially reenact the crime. 
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